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Abstract 
We conducted a two-nation study (United States, n = 1500; England, n = 1500) to test a novel 
theory of science communication. The cultural cognition thesis posits that individuals make extensive 
reliance on cultural meanings in forming perceptions of risk. The logic of the cultural cognition thesis 
suggests the potential value of a distinctive two-channel science communication strategy that combines 
information content (“Channel 1”) with cultural meanings (“Channel 2”) selected to promote open-
minded assessment of information across diverse communities. In the study, scientific information con-
tent on climate change was held constant while the cultural meaning of that information was experimen-
tally manipulated. Consistent with the study hypotheses, we found that making citizens aware of the po-
tential contribution of geoengineering as a supplement to restriction of CO2 emissions helps to offset cul-
tural polarization over the validity of climate-change science. We also tested the hypothesis, derived from 
competing models of science communication, that exposure to information on geoengineering would pro-
voke discounting of climate-change risks generally. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that subjects 
exposed to information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned about climate change risks 
than those assigned to a control condition. 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981907
Introduction 
The investigation of geoengineering has begun in earnest. From the erection of towering “carbon 
scrubbers” to the launching of nanotechnology solar reflectors; from seeding the ocean with iron pellets to 
injecting aerosol particulates into the stratosphere—“ ‘geoengineering’ refers to deliberate, large-scale 
manipulations of Earth’s environment designed to offset some of the harmful consequences of [green-
house-gas induced] climate change” (National Research Council 2010). Impetus for the development of 
such technologies comes from mounting evidence of both the inability of industrial societies to muster the 
political will to curb CO2 emissions and the likely negligible effect of such limits even if widely adopted 
(“Time to act” 2009; Morton 2009). The U.S. National Academy of Science (National Research Council 
2010, 2011) and the Royal Society (2009) in the U.K. and are among the preeminent scientific authorities 
that have issued preliminary reports calling for stepped up research efforts to develop geoengineering—
and to assess the risks that resorting to it might itself pose to the physical environment.  
This paper addresses the contribution geoengineering might make to another environment: the de-
liberative one in which democratic societies like the United States and Great Britain make sense of scien-
tific evidence relating to climate change. The scientific exploration of geoengineering as a policy re-
sponse, we conclude, could have an important impact on public debate not just because of the factual in-
formation it is likely to yield but also because of the cultural message it is likely to express about what it 
means to regard climate change as a serious problem. 
Guided by a theory of how cultural meanings influence public perceptions of risk, we conducted a 
study to assess how being made aware of geoengineering might affect the receptivity of citizens to sound 
scientific information on climate change. The study subjects consisted of two large and diverse samples, 
one from the United States and the other from England. Consistent with the study hypotheses, we found 
that groups of citizens disposed by opposing cultural values to form conflicting assessments of the risks 
of climate change became less polarized over scientific evidence when they learned that geoengineering is 
under consideration as a potential solution.  
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Following a brief discussion of the theoretical framework that informed its design, we describe 
the study and report the results. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the role of geoengi-
neering in debates over climate change, and for the importance of taking cultural meanings into account 
in science communication generally. 
Theoretical background 
Three models of risk perception 
The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by two models (Ka-
han 2010). The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate 
and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected 
utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of 
the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk infor-
mation is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 
2003; Sunstein, 2005). 
Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over climate change—or a host of other 
putative societal risks, such as nuclear power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal 
of restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes conspicuously feature partisan 
divisions over facts that admit of scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts 
that people with different values or opposing political commitments will draw radically different infe-
rences from common information. Likewise, nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people 
who subscribe to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than those who sub-
scribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce systematic divisions of opinion of among such 
groups. 
One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). CCT says that cultural 
values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psy-
chological mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that re-
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flect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, 
Cohen, Gastil & Slovic 2010; Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009; DiMaggio 1997). Thus, persons with indivi-
dualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of environmental and technological risks, 
which if widely accepted would justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that people with such 
values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals with hierarchical values, who see assertions of 
environmental risk as indictments of social elites. Individuals with egalitarian and communitarian values, 
in contrast, see commerce and industry as sources of unjust disparity and symbols of noxious self-
seeking, and thus readily credit assertions that these activities are hazardous and therefore worthy of regu-
lation (Douglass & Wildavsky 1982). Observational and experimental studies have linked these and com-
parable sets of outlooks to myriad risk controversies, including the one over climate change (Kahan 
2010b). 
Individuals, on the CCT account, behave not as expected-utility weighers—rational or irration-
al—but rather as cultural evaluators of risk information (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006). The be-
liefs any individual forms on societal risks like climate change—whether right or wrong—do not mea-
ningfully affect his or her personal exposure to those risks. However, precisely because positions on those 
issues are commonly understood to cohere with allegiance to one or another cultural style, taking a posi-
tion at odds with the dominant view in his or her cultural group is likely to compromise that individual’s 
relationship with others on whom that individual depends for emotional and material support. As individ-
uals, citizens are thus likely to do better in their daily lives when they adopt toward putative hazards the 
stances that express their commitment to values that they share with others, irrespective of the fit between 
those beliefs and the actuarial magnitudes and probabilities of those risks. Empirical evidence suggests 
that ordinary citizens are reliably guided toward such stances by unconscious processing of cues, such as 
the emotional resonances of arguments and the apparent values of risk communicators (Kahan, Jenkins-
Smith & Braman 2011; Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009; Jenkins-Smith 2001). But, contrary to the picture 
painted by the irrational-weigher model, ordinary citizens who are equipped and disposed to appraise 
scientific evidence of risk in a reflective, analytic manner do not necessarily converge in their beliefs; in-
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stead they will often become even more culturally polarized because of the special capacity they have to 
search out and interpret evidence in patterns that sustain the convergence between their risk perceptions 
and their group identities (Mercier & Sperber 2011; Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & 
Mandel 2012). 
Two channels of science communication 
The rational- and irrational-weigher models of risk perception generate competing prescriptions 
for science communication. The former posits that individuals can be expected, eventually, to form em-
pirically sound positions so long as they are furnished with sufficient and sufficiently accurate informa-
tion (e.g., Viscusi 1983; Philipson & Posner 1993). The latter asserts that the attempts to educate the pub-
lic about risk are at best futile, since the public lacks the knowledge and capacity to comprehend; at worst 
such efforts are self-defeating, since ordinary individuals are prone to overreact on the basis of fear and 
other affective influences on judgment. The better strategy is to steer risk policymaking away from demo-
cratically accountable actors to politically insulated experts and to “change the subject” when risk issues 
arise in public debate (Sunstein 2005, p. 125; see also Breyer 1993). 
The cultural-evaluator model associated with CCT offers a more nuanced account. It recognizes 
that when empirical claims about societal risk become suffused with antagonistic cultural meanings, in-
tensified efforts to disseminate sound information are unlikely to generate consensus and can even stimu-
late conflict. But those instances are exceptional—indeed, pathological. There are vastly more risk is-
sues—from the hazards of power lines to the side-effects of antibiotics to the tumor-stimulating conse-
quences of cell phones—that avoid becoming broadly entangled with antagonistic cultural meanings. Us-
ing the same ability that they reliably employ to seek and follow expert medical treatment when they are 
ill or expert auto-mechanic service when their car breaks down, the vast majority of ordinary citizens can 
be counted on in these “normal,” non-pathological cases to discern and conform their beliefs to the best 
available scientific evidence (Gigerenzer 2008). 
The cultural-evaluator model therefore counsels a two-channel strategy of science communica-
tion. Channel 1 is focused on information content and is informed by the best available understandings of 
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how to convey empirically sound evidence, the basis and significance of which are readily accessible to 
ordinary citizens (e.g., Gigerenzer 2000; Spiegelhalter, Pearson & Short 2011). Channel 2 focuses on cul-
tural meanings: the myriad cues—from group affinities and antipathies to positive and negative affective 
resonances to congenial or hostile narrative structures—that individuals unconsciously rely on to deter-
mine whether a particular stance toward a putative risk is consistent with their defining commitments. To 
be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in addition to 
furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself 
of the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange them from 
their communities (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006; Nisbet & Scheufele 2009; Nisbet 2009). 
Study 
We designed a study to test the two-channel science communication strategy associated with 
CCT and the cultural-evaluator model. The goal was to determine whether making geoengineering salient 
as a potential solution to the risks associated with climate would convey via Channel 2 cultural meanings 
that neutralize or dampen defensive resistance to sound information transmitted via Channel 1. 
Sample 
The sample consisted of approximately 3,000 individuals, half drawn from a nationally represent-
ative U.S. panel and half from a nationally representative English one.1 The subjects’ values were meas-
ured with two “worldview” scales—Hierarchy-egalitarianism (“Hierarchy”), and Individualism-
communitarianism (“Individualism”)—used in studies of cultural cognition (Kahan 2012). 
Design 
The study subjects were instructed to read an excerpt from an article published in the journal “Na-
ture Science.” The Nature Science article, a composite of actual ones published in Nature (Allen, Frame, 
Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen & Meinshausen 2009) and the Proceedings of the National 
                                       
1 Additional information relating to the study sample, and the experimental stimuli and measures appears in the 
Supplementary Material. 
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Academies of Science (Solomon, Plattner, Knutti & Friedlingstein 2009), reported evidence suggesting 
that previous estimates of atmospheric CO2 dissipation had been overly optimistic. The new evidence, 
according to the article, suggested that the staggered introduction of emission limits and the eventual cap-
ping of them at 450-600 ppm would be insufficient to avert a string of environmental catastrophes. Rising 
sea levels would still submerge “coastal and island” regions across the world. At the same time, “ persis-
tent decreases in dry-season rainfall” would inflict conditions “comparable to the 1930s North American 
Dust Bowl” across the interiors of multiple continents. Indeed, the new evidence implied that “irreversible 
climate changes due to CO2 emissions have already taken place,” and that “even if we could halt human 
carbon emissions today, the world would face risks of climate change for well over 1,000 years” (Figure 
1). 
After reading the Nature Science article, subjects reported their assessments of the information it 
contained. On a six-point scale, subjects indicated their level of disagreement or agreement with state-
ments such as “[c]omputer models like those relied on in the study are not a reliable basis for predicting 
the impact of CO2 on the climate”; “[m]ore studies must be done before policymakers rely on the findings 
of the Nature Science study”; and “[t]he scientists who did the study were biased.” They also indicated 
“how convincing” they found the study on a scale of 0 (“completely unconvincing”) to 10 (“completely 
convincing”). Responses to the items formed a reliable scale (α = 0.84), which we labeled study_validity 
and coded to reflect how disposed subjects were to credit the study. 
We also collected information on our subjects’ beliefs about climate change. They thus indicated 
“how much risk” they perceived “climate change poses to human health, safety, or prosperity” on a scale 
of 0 (“no risk at all”) to 10 (“extreme risk”). They also indicated on a six-point scale the level of their dis-
agreement or agreement with statements such as “[a]verage global temperatures are increasing”; 
“[h]uman activity is causing global temperatures to rise”; and “unless steps are taken to counteract global 
warming, there will be bad consequences for human beings.” These items, too, formed a reliable scale (α 
-7- 
= 0.93), which we labeled cc_risk, and coded to reflect how disposed subjects were to be concerned about 
climate-change risks. 
The study involved an experimental manipulation as well. Before reading the Nature Science ar-
ticle and responding to the various items on the soundness of the study and on climate change, our sub-
jects were divided into three groups, each of which was instructed to read a news report. In the “anti-
pollution” condition, subjects read a story in which members of the “American Academy of Geophysical 
Scientists,” responding to the Nature Science article, called for adoption an atmospheric-CO2 ceiling even 
lower than the 450 ppm threshold described as “a target” level “approved by the United Nations.” In the 
“geoengineering” condition, in contrast, subjects read a news story in which members of the AAGS called 
for greater investments in geoengineering as a necessary and more effective alternative to even stricter 
CO2-emission limits. Finally, in the “control” condition, subjects read a story about a municipal board’s 
adoption of a measure requiring developers to post bonds to cover the cost of traffic lights necessitated by 
commercial property developments (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Experimental stimuli. Subjects read and evaluated the Nature-Science article, a composite of real articles 
reporting findings on expected rate of CO2 dissipation, after reading a newspaper story specific to the experimental 
condition to which they had been assigned.  
Hypotheses 
This design permitted us to observe how exposure to contrasting policy proposals affected both 
our subjects’ assessments of the Nature Science study and their perceptions of climate change. To sharpen 
Nature Science article anti-pollutioncontrol geoengineering
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the testing of hypotheses related to the two-communication strategy, we also formed contrasting ones in-
formed by the competing theories of risk perception (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Summary of hypotheses. The three models of risk perception generate opposing hypotheses about the 
impact of the experimental manipulation. The rational-weigher model predicts that subjects in the anti-pollution and 
geoengineering conditions will see the Nature Science study as more valid than do subjects in the control condition. 
The irrational-weigher model predicts the opposite. The cultural evaluator model predicts that the impact of the ma-
nipulation on assessments of the Nature Science study will interact with subjects’ values and that polarization will 
be larger in the anti-pollution condition than in the geoengineering condition. The offsetting effects of the manipula-
tion on subjects of opposing cultural views is expected to result no net main effect in the anti-pollution condition and 
either no or a very small positive main effect in the geoengineering condition. 
The rational weigher model might be thought to imply that subjects in the anti-pollution and 
geoengineering conditions would be more likely than control-condition subjects to credit the Nature 
Science study. The expert scientists relied on the study in both the anti-pollution and geoengineering ver-
sions of the news story but were described as “unaffiliated with” the study authors, who were themselves 
identified as “researchers from the Massachusetts of Technology.” A rational reader would likely regard 
geoengineeringanti-pollutioncontrol
Rational Weigher
Irrational Weigher
Cultural Evaluator
Credit
Dismiss
Hierarch individ
Egal commun
Credit
Dismiss
Credit
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Unconcerned
Main effect
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the willingness of independent experts to accept the Nature Science findings as more reason to view the 
study as valid.  
Giving greater weight to the study, moreover, the anti-pollution and geoengineering condition 
subjects should be at least as concerned about climate change risks as control-condition subjects. One 
might not expect an especially dramatic shift in the risk perceptions of anti-pollution and geoengineering 
subjects; after all, they were likely to have been exposed to ample information on climate change before 
the study, making the incremental effect of the position attributed to the expert scientists in the respective 
news stories small. But under the rational-weigher model, one would certainly not expect anti-pollution 
and geoengineering subjects to be less concerned about climate change risks than ones in the control con-
dition. 
One might predict this result, however, if one anticipated that the subjects would react irrational-
ly. Many scholars believe that ordinary citizens are motivated to resist dire information about climate-
change risks in order to reduce fear or anxiety (Shepherd & Kay 2011; Lorezoni, Nicholson-Cole & 
Whitmarsh 2007). In a similar vein, others have warned that exposure to information on geoengineering 
might suppress public concern over climate change by gratifying the public demand to believe that rising 
atmospheric CO2 levels do not pose a serious danger—a dynamic referred to as a “moral hazard effect” 
(National Environmental Research Council 2010; Parson 2006).   
Both of these expectations reflect the irrational-weigher theory. If one accepts that model, then, 
one might predict that subjects in the anti-pollution condition—their anxieties freshly stoked by the alarm 
of the AAGS scientists in the news story—to be less inclined to credit the Nature Science study, and more 
skeptical of climate-change risk generally, than their less perturbed counterparts in the control condition. 
Buffeted by reinforcing waves of denial (in reaction to the Nature Science study) and false hope (in reac-
tion to the geoengineering news story), geoengineering condition subjects could be expected, on this 
(il)logic, to be even more dismissive. 
Unlike the rational- and irrational-weigher models, the cultural evaluator model predicts that the 
impact of the experimental manipulation will depend on subjects’ values. Concern for climate change 
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signifies apprehension about the limits and dangers of commerce and technology. This cultural meaning 
is congenial to egalitarian communitarians, who are morally ambivalent about such activities. It is ana-
thema, however, to hierarchical individualists, who prize those very things. We anticipated that these re-
sonances would be strongly evoked both by the anti-pollution condition new story, which not only re-
ported the demand of the AAGS scientists for stricter CO2-emission controls but also featured anti-
commerce and -technology images: one of smokestacks billowing clouds of (presumably) carbon-
saturated emissions, and another depicting women from India who (presumably) would be adversely af-
fected by climate change underneath a “SAVE THE CLIMATE” banner. These cultural meanings would 
create a psychic incentive for hierarchical individualists to dismiss, and for egalitarian communitarians to 
credit, the Nature Science study. Under the two-channel science communication model, then, we should 
expect subjects in the anti-pollution condition to be more polarized over the validity of the study than 
those in the control condition.  
Assignment to the geoengineering condition, however, should have the opposite effect. Geoengi-
neering symbolizes the ability of humans to invent technologies that modify the environment and thus 
overcome limits on commerce and industry. The geoengineering news story contained artist renditions of 
two geoengineering technologies—carbon scrubbers, which were shown in a mountain wilderness scene; 
and a flying “turbine-fitted vessel” spraying clouds with a “reflective” whitener—that we expected to am-
plify these connotations. It makes sense to resort to geoengineering only if climate change is occurring 
and will cause harm if unchecked. But precisely because geoengineering is a solution that affirms rather 
than denigrates the values of hierarchical individualists, the geoengineering-condition news story trans-
mits via Channel 2 meanings that offset the pressure on such persons to dismiss the information content 
being transmitted via Channel 1. The cultural evaluator model thus predicts that polarization over the va-
lidity of the Nature Science study should be mitigated in the geoengineering condition relative to the anti-
pollution condition.  
Unlike the irrational-weigher model, the cultural evaluator model furnishes no reason to expect 
either the anti-pollution or geoengineering subjects to become less concerned about climate change risks 
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than control subjects. Because the responses of egalitarian communitarians and hierarchical individualists 
can be expected to offset one another, the impact of the Nature Science study should be close to nil in the 
anti-pollution condition. In the geoengineering condition, overall concern with climate change could even 
increase as a result of the willingness of hierarchical individualists to give more credence to the Nature 
Science study.  
But support for the cultural evaluator model does not depend on observing a result this dramatic. 
Subjects of opposing cultural outlooks can be expected to come to the study with strongly held and diver-
gent beliefs on climate change—including ones about the weight of opinion among expert scientists (Ka-
han, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011). The logic of the two-channel strategy of science communication 
does not entail that exposure to a single piece of additional evidence will change the position of either 
side to a significant degree. What it does imply, however, is that an appropriate integration of meaning 
and information content can ameliorate the tendency of culturally diverse citizens to form opposing be-
liefs about the validity and weight of any particular piece of evidence. In a science communication envi-
ronment free of this impetus to disagreement, citizens of diverse outlooks are much more likely to con-
verge on sound science over time—and indeed, less likely to become divided about it in the first place. 
The decisive test for the two-channel strategy, then, is the hypothesis that assignment to the geoengineer-
ing condition will reduce cultural polarization over strength of the Nature Science study. 
Results 
Overall, the study subjects were ambivalent. Scores on the individual items used to measure “how 
convincing” the subjects found the Nature Science study (M = 5.4, SEM = 0.05) and “how serious” they 
regarded “the risk pose[d]” by “climate change” (M = 6.16, SEM = 0.06) were both close to the middle of 
their respective ranges. Mean scores for members of the English subsample were higher on both measures 
than were those for members of the U.S. subsample, but by very small margins (Figure 3). 
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The experimental manipulation had no meaningful main effect on evaluation of the Nature 
Science study (Table SI-3, model 1).2 The mean score on study_validity, the scale used to measure the 
disposition to credit the study, was slightly higher in the geoengineering condition than in the control 
condition (ΔM = 0.06, SEM = 0.05), but the difference was nonsignificant for the entire sample (p = 0.18) 
and for both national subsamples (U.S.: ΔM = 0.05, SEM = 0.06, p = 0.47; England: ΔM = 0.08, SEM = 
0.07, p = 0.23).  
 
Figure 3. Assessments of convincingness of study and seriousness of climate change risks. U.S. n = 1431; Eng-
land n = 1398. CIs denote 0.95 level of confidence. 
The experimental manipulation did have a main effect on climate-change risks, but only a small 
one (Table SI-4, model 1; Figure 4). The mean score on cc_risk, the scale used to measure the disposition 
to credit climate-change risks, was slightly (and significantly) higher in the geoengineering condition than 
in the control condition (ΔM = 0.13, SEM = 0.05, p < 0.01). The impact of the experimental manipulation 
on cc_risk did not differ to any meaningful degree for the two national subsamples. 
                                       
2 The study hypotheses were tested by multivariate regression analyses. The results of those analyses and additional 
discussion of them appear in the Supplementary Material. 
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Figure 4. Main effects of experimental manipulation. Estimates derived from multivariate regression (Table SI-3, 
model 1, & Table SI-4, model 1). Y-axis reflects the z-score on the respective scales. CIs denote 0.95 level of confi-
dence. 
Both study_validity and cc_risk were of intermediate value in the anti-pollution condition. But 
neither differed by a meaningful or statistically significant amount from the score in the corresponding 
measure in either of the other two conditions.  
 
Figure 5. Cultural polarization (across all conditions). Estimates derived from multivariate regression (Table SI-
3, model 2). Y-axis reflects the z-score on the respective scales. CIs denote 0.95 level of confidence. 
Breaking the subjects down by cultural worldviews, however, revealed them to be highly pola-
rized. Consistent with previous studies (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011; Leiserowitz 2005), Egali-
tarian Communitarian subjects were substantially more concerned about climate change risks than were 
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ones who were hierarchical and individualistic (Table SI-3, model 1). The degree of polarization was 
larger among U.S. subjects, but still pronounced among English ones (Figure 5). 
There was also a significant interaction between the experimental manipulation and subjects’ cul-
tural worldviews. Cultural polarization over the validity of the Nature Science study was more pro-
nounced in the anti-pollution condition than in the geoengineering condition (Figure 6). This effect was 
present in both national subsamples, but was larger in the U.S. subsample, where the level of polarization 
in the anti-pollution condition also exceeded the level observed in the control condition (Table SI-3, mod-
el 2). 
 
Figure 6. Experimental manipulation, main effect and culture interactions. Estimates derived from multivariate 
regression (Table SI-3, model 1; & Table SI-4, model 1, for “Main effects”; Table SI-3, model 3; & Table SI-4, 
model 3 for cultural worldview effects). Estimates for cultural worldview effects determined by setting scores on 
both Hierarchy and Individualism at +1 SD for “Hierarch individ” and -1 SD for “Egal commun.” Y-axis reflects the 
z-score on the respective scales. CIs denote 0.95 level of confidence. 
The experimental manipulation also had a small impact on the intensity of the cultural polariza-
tion over climate-change risks (Table SI-4, model 3; Figure 6). Assignment to the anti-pollution condition 
as opposed to the control condition intensified the association between Hierarchy and dismissal of cli-
mate-change risks (Table SI-3, models 3). However, the gap in cc_risk scores associated with being si-
multaneously hierarchical and individualistic as opposed to simultaneously egalitarian and communitarian 
did not vary significantly between the experimental conditions (Table SI-3, models 3-4). 
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Analysis and Interpretation 
This pattern of results supports the hypotheses derived from the cultural evaluator model. Al-
though subjects in one had no more or less information relevant to assessing the validity of the study than 
those in the other, the two conditions conveyed different meanings. Relative to the control, the anti-
pollution news story accentuated the conventional anti-commerce and anti-technology meanings that mo-
tivate Hierarchical Individualists and Egalitarian Communitarians to disagree about the evidence on cli-
mate change risks. The geoengineering news story, in contrast, linked climate-change science to cultural 
meanings—of human ingenuity and of overcoming natural limits on commerce and industry—that at least 
partially offset the threat that crediting such information would normally pose to the identity of Hierar-
chical Individualists. Consistent with the two-channel science communication strategy, cultural polariza-
tion over the Nature Science study was reduced in the geoengineering condition. 
The results of the study do not support the hypotheses derived from either of the other two mod-
els of risk perception and science communication. One irrational-weigher hypothesis was that the anxiety 
aroused by the reaction of the scientists in the anti-pollution news story would likely generate more resis-
tance to the Nature Science study in the anti-pollution condition than in the control. Another hypothesis 
associated with that model suggested that “false hope” stimulated by the geoengineering news story 
would generate a disposition to discount climate change risks generally. The rational-weigher model, in 
contrast, predicted that the subjects in both the anti-pollution and geoengineering conditions would have 
reason to give the Nature Science study more credence than ones in the control condition, and possibly, as 
a result, revise upward their assessment of the seriousness of climate-change risks. 
These effects were not observed. In aggregate, evaluations of the validity of the study did not 
vary in any meaningful way between the conditions. Consistent with the cultural evaluator model, this 
effect reflects the offsetting impact of the judgments of subjects of diverse worldviews.  
Contrary to the “moral hazard” effect posited by the irrational-weigher model, subjects in the 
geoengineering condition did not become sanguine about climate change risks. Indeed, on the whole, they 
displayed more concern over climate change than ones in the control condition (Figure 4).  
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The effect, however, was quite small. Moreover, if this was the increased concern with climate 
change predicted by the rational-weigher theory, then this effect apparently depended on the power of the 
geoengineering news story to mitigate cultural polarization over the validity of the Nature Science study. 
Two additional points about the results are worth noting. First, the geoengineering condition di-
minished polarization over the validity of the Nature Science study relative to the anti-pollution condition 
only. The degree of polarization that persisted in the geoengineering condition, in other words, was com-
parable to that which existed in the control. 
Second, the impact of the geoengineering treatment appeared to be symmetric. Whereas Hierar-
chical Individualists (subjects who scored in the top 50% on both Hierarchy and Individualism) assigned 
to the geoengineering condition had a higher mean score on study_validity than their counterparts in the 
anti-pollution condition (ΔM = 0.17, SEM = 0.08, p = 0.03), Egalitarian Communitarians (those who 
scored in the bottom 50% on both Hierarchy and Individualism) gave it a comparably lower one (ΔM = -
0.20, SEM = 0.08, p = 0.01). Depolarization occurred, then, because both moved toward the mean, and 
not merely because Hierarchical Individualists became less dismissive. 
These results also lend support the more basic premises of two-channel model of science commu-
nication. In the real world, there is no “control condition”: people get scientific information about climate 
change in the course of practical deliberations about what to do. The two-channel model implies only that 
the relative salience of different proposals can make a difference in the acceptance of such information 
when those proposals bear contrasting cultural meanings. The relative effects of the anti-pollution and 
geoengineering conditions on evaluations of the Nature Science study corroborate this conclusion. 
In addition, the cultural cognition thesis does not imply that only one side in the debate over cli-
mate change or other issues is reacting with identity-defensive bias. The culturally symmetric effect of the 
geoengineering condition is thus not contrary to the basic conjecture that the advent of geoengineering 
can be used to convey meanings along Channel 2 that conduce to open-minded consideration of climate 
change science by citizens of diverse outlooks. 
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As we understand it, the goal of democracy-promoting science communication is not to stifle citi-
zens’ critical engagement with scientific information but rather to remove from their deliberative envi-
ronment antagonistic cultural meanings and other influences that predictably distort the quality of such 
engagement. The proper measure of success for a two-channel strategy, then, is not its impact on making 
any group of citizens more or less disposed to credit a particular form of scientific evidence—much less 
to impel them into a state of agreement with any particular conclusion—but rather its success in abating 
antagonisms in meaning that drive citizens of diverse worldviews apart when they consider such evidence 
in common.  
That is exactly the effect that the geoengineering treatment had (Figure 7). On the whole, subjects 
in that condition were neither more accepting nor more skeptical toward the scientific evidence presented. 
But insofar as the geoengineering treatment reduced cultural polarization over the study relative to the 
anti-pollution treatment, the geoengineering subjects’ reactions displayed a more open-minded quality of 
common engagement, one that could be expected to move them progressively toward convergence if it 
could be amplified and maintained over time. 
 
 Figure 7. Impact of experimental manipulation on cultural polarization relating to study_validity. Estimates 
derived from multivariate regression (Table SI-3, model 3). Point estimates reflect the difference between the esti-
mated score of a prototypical egalitarian communitarian (-1 SD on both Hierarchy and Individualism scales) and 
that of a prototypical hierarchical individualist (+1 SD on both scales). Y-axis reflects the difference measured in z-
score increments. CIs denote 0.95 level of confidence. 
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Implications for science communication 
The results of the study furnished support for the cultural evaluator model relative to rival models 
of risk perception and science communication. The cultural cognition thesis implies that ordinary citizens, 
as cultural evaluators of risk, process scientific information via two channels: one that relates to the con-
tent of that information; and another that assesses the compatibility of assent to it with expression of their 
defining group commitments. The effect that making emission-controls salient had in accentuating identi-
ty-protective reactions to climate-change information, and the effect that making geoengineering salient 
had in reducing such reactions, supports this position. Rival models that emphasize rational and irrational 
weighing of scientific information are not consistent with this result.  
The study finding has two important practical implications. The first concerns the significance of 
geoengineering in public deliberations over climate change. The second has to do with the significance of 
meaning in science communication more generally. 
What geoengineering might do to/for the deliberation environment 
Just as scientists have started to investigate the feasibility of geoengineering as one response to 
climate change, so science communication scholars have started to consider how information about 
geoengineering should be transmitted to the public. At least some scholars believe that political conflict 
over climate change reflects the failure of risk communicators to convey existing scientific evidence with 
sufficient clarity. Building on this view, other commentators have advocated that information about 
geoengineering be downplayed lest it interfere with efforts to focus public attention on the dangers that 
climate change poses and thus erode political motivation to do anything to counteract it (Nation-
al Environmental Research Council 2010; Parson 2006). 
The cultural cognition thesis furnishes reason to be skeptical of this reasoning, which can be seen 
as reflecting an amalgam of sensibilities associated with the rational- and irrational-weigher models of 
risk perception. Contrary to the rational-weigher view, the reason that many people dismiss evidence of 
the seriousness of climate change is not that they have been exposed to insufficient information about its 
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potential negative consequences for society, but rather than such information has been suffused with 
meanings that threaten their cultural outlooks. Instead of worrying, then, that the public might over-
estimate the efficacy of potential responses to climate change—an irrational-weigher anxiety—science 
communicators should be looking for ways to dissipate the meanings that make large, politically conse-
quential segments of the population dismissive of the evidence that there is anything to worry about. 
The study results suggest that geoengineering might be able to play a role in doing that. Geoengi-
neering is consonant with a narrative that depicts human technological ingenuity as the principal means 
by which our species has succeeded in overcoming environmental constraints on its flourishing. Geoengi-
neering permits climate change to be assimilated into this story and thus turns climate change from an 
indictment of hierarchical individualists’ values into an occasion in which the forms of human excellence 
that such citizens prize can again be deployed for the advance of human welfare.  
From this point of view, the anxiety that geoengineering might “let the air out” of efforts to 
arouse political concern with climate change has things exactly backwards. In order to overcome cultural 
resistance to sound scientific evidence that a problem exists, the two-channel communication strategy 
associated with the cultural evaluator model says that people of diverse values must all be shown solu-
tions that they find culturally congenial. 
None of this is to say, of course, that geoengineering of any particular form is necessarily an ap-
propriate response to climate change. The feasibility and risks of geoengineering are open issues that de-
mand intensive scientific study, as both the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 
2010, 2011) and the Royal Society (2009) have stressed. 
That geoengineering will and should be investigated is the only assumption that the argument for 
harnessing its contribution to public discourse depends on. Open-minded public engagement with scien-
tific information requires a deliberation environment in which no group of citizens is forced to see assent 
to sound evidence as hostile to its defining commitments. In cultivating such an environment for delibera-
tions over the problem of climate change, the diverse cultural resonances associated with the full range of 
potential responses is a resource to be exploited in science communication. 
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Cultural cognition and meaningful science communication  
According to the cultural cognition thesis, group values pervade the psychological mechanisms 
by which individuals form perceptions of risk. Individuals behave not like rational- or irrational-weighers 
but like cultural evaluators, adopting toward risks stances that affirm their commitment to their preferred 
view of how society should be organized (Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009; Kahan 2008). The experimental 
results we’ve reported in this paper support this understanding. 
But more so than previous studies of cultural cognition, this one demonstrates how a deeper un-
derstanding of this dynamic can be used to improve science communication. Whereas most such studies 
have furnished evidence of how identity-threatening meanings can provoke resistance to sound science 
(e.g., Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, Cohen 2009; Jenkins-Smith 
2001), this one confirms that framing climate-change science with identity-affirming meanings can miti-
gate such resistance. 
Moreover, the particular framing technique featured in this study is likely only one of many that 
can be expected to achieve this effect (Nisbett 2010). Indeed, previous studies suggest that attention to 
assuring the cultural diversity of science communicators can likewise dissipate cultural polarization (Ka-
han, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic 2010). So, too, there is reason to believe, can communication cog-
nizant of the heterogeneous narrative structures that citizens of diverse outlooks use to process informa-
tion (Earle & Cvetckovich 1995; Jones & McBeth 2010). Likely there are still other devices (LaMarre 
2009; Cohen, Bastardi, Sherman, Hsu, McGoey & Ross 2007; Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim & Prenovost 
2007; Sherman, Nelson & Ross 2003) that can arrest the identity-protective anxiety that makes cultural 
cognition a barrier to engaged and instructive deliberation over policy-relevant science. 
Recognizing that there are two channels of science communication—a meaning channel as well 
as a content channel—is a one of the many insights associated with an emerging science of science com-
munication. The perfection of that science is the key not just to diagnosing the pathologies that constrain 
science communication in democracy but to effectively treating them as well. 
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Conclusion 
Cultural commitments are intrinsic to human rationality. It is only through access to networks of 
trust and authority that human beings (experts as well as lay people) are able to form reliable assessments 
of whom to trust on what, and thus to accumulate and share collective knowledge. The distinct networks 
that various groups of citizens rely on usually lead them to converge on the best available information. 
Nevertheless, the sheer number and diversity of cultural communities that inhabit pluralistic democracies 
assures—almost with mathematical certainty (Braman, Kahan & Grimmelmann 2005)—that risks and 
other policy-consequential facts will on occasion become suffused with antagonistic meanings, generating 
conflict that persists even in the face of ample and widely distributed scientific evidence. Although small 
in proportion to the number of complex scientific issues on which diverse citizens unremarkably (almost 
invisibly) reach agreement, these cultural meaning conflicts can pose a disproportionately large threat to 
the health, safety, and prosperity—and even to the deliberative capacity—of self-governing societies. 
Identifying how to protect the deliberation environment from this distinctive toxin, we submit, is the cen-
tral mission of the science of science communication in a democratic society. 
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 Supplementary Material 
1. Information on sample 
The study was administered on-line to a broadly representative sample of 1,500 U.S. adults and 
1,500 English adults between July 27 and August 2, 2011. Subjects were recruited by Polime-
trix/YOUGOV, Inc., a public opinion research firm that conducts on-line surveys and experiments on be-
half of academic and governmental researchers and commercial customers (including political cam-
paigns). Polimetrix used stratification methods designed to generate a sample demographically compara-
ble to the national adult populations in the U.S. and England. See https://s3.amazonaws.com/yg-
public/Scientific/Sample+Matching_JSM.pdf.. 
 
n Female Avg. Age White Black Avg. Education Median Annual Income 
US 1,500 54% 51 yrs. 71% 12% some college $40,000-$49,000 
UK 1,500 52% 45 yrs. 94% 1% GCSE/ O' levels £25,000-£29,000 
Table SI-1. Subsample demographics. Characteristics of study subjects selected via demographic matching. 
Because the study was lengthy and cognitively demanding, completion times were checked to 
confirm the persistence of subjects’ good-faith effort to perform the necessary reading and assessments. 
Sixty-nine U.S. subjects and 102 English ones who completed the study in an unrealistically short time 
period (less than six minutes) were removed, resulting in a final total sample of 2,829 (U.S., n = 1,431; 
England, n = 1,398). 
2. Cultural worldviews 
Subjects’ cultural values or “worldviews” were measured with items used in previous studies of 
cultural cognition. These items characterize worldviews along two cross-cutting dimensions: Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism (“Hierarchy”) and Individualism-Communitarianism (“Individualism”) (Figure SI-1). The 
former set of items indicate attitudes toward social orderings that connect authority to stratified social 
roles based on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such as gender, race, and class. The 
latter indicate attitudes toward social orderings that reflect an expectation that individuals will secure their 
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own well-being without assistance or interference from society versus those that assign society the obliga-
tion to secure collective welfare and the power to override competing individual interests. For all items, 
subjects indicated agreement or disagreement on a six-point scale (Kahan 2012). 
 
Figure SI-1. Cultural cognition of risk. Using attitudinal scales, cultural cognition measures cultural worldviews, 
or preferences for how society and other collective undertakings should be organized, along two dimensions: “Hie-
rarchy-Egalitarianism” and “Individualism-Communitarianism.” The theory on which it is based posits that percep-
tions of environmental and technological risks should be expected to diminish as worldviews become simultaneous-
ly more hierarchical and individualistic, and increase as worldviews become simultaneously more egalitarian and 
communitarian. Other types of risks, including ones relating to public health and social deviance, can be expected to 
vary more dramatically as worldviews become progressively more hierarchical and communitarian or progressively 
more egalitarian and individualistic. Survey and experimental studies have found support for these predictions (Wil-
davsky & Dake 1990; Jenkins-Smith 2001; Kahan, Braman, Monahan, Callahan & Peters 2010; Kahan, Braman, 
Slovic, Gastil & Cohen 2009; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic & Mertz 2007). 
For this study, we used short-form versions of Hierarchy and Individualism, each of which con-
sisted of six items (Table SI-2). Minor variations were made in wording for certain items administered to 
the English subsample in order to assure conformity to English usage.  In factor analyses performed sepa-
rately on each subsample, the worldview items loaded appropriately on two discrete factors corresponding 
to Hierarchy and Individualism; in addition, the two six-item sets, which formed reliable scales in each 
Hierarchy
Egalitarianism
Individualism
industry, technology: low risk Abortion procedure:
high risk
Cultural Cognition of Risk
Communitarianism
Restricting gun ownership: 
high risk
compulsory psychiatric treatment:
low risk
Restricting gun ownership: 
low risk
Abortion procedure:
low risk
compulsory psychiatric treatment:
high risk
industry, technology: high risk
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subsample considered separately (U.S.: Hierarchy, α = 0.88; Individualism, α = 0.84; England, Hierarchy, 
α = 0.76; Individualism, α = 0.73), remained reliable when the two subsamples were combined (Hie-
rarchy, α = 0.84; Individualism, α = 0.80). This comparability in the covariance structures of the scales 
for the two national subsamples implies their equivalence as measures of variance in the specified dispo-
sitions across the sample as a whole (Tran 2009).   
The factor scores generated separately within each subsample were retained in the aggregated da-
ta. This form of standardization assures that nation-specific differences in response-style do not alter the 
covariance between the worldview measures, on the one hand, and the study outcome measures, on the 
other, when the subsamples are merged into one sample for analysis (Fischer 2004).  
Individualism-Communitarianism (Individualism) 
IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. 
CHARM. 
Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting them-
selves. 
IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves. 
IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives. 
CPROTECT. 
The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if that means limit-
ing the freedom and choices of individuals. 
CLIMCHOI. 
Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't [get 
in the way of/interfere with] what's good for society. 
  
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism (Hierarchy) 
HEQUAL.  We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. 
EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal. 
ERADEQ. 
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the poor, whites and 
[people of color/ethnic minorities], and men and women. 
EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society. 
HREVDIS2. 
 It seems like [blacks/ethnic minorities], women, homosexuals and other groups don't 
want equal rights, they want special rights just for them. 
HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine. 
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Table SI-2 Cultural worldview items. Bracketed material indicates wordings that were varied for the national sub-
samples. In each bracket, the wording before the slash (“/”) was included in the version of the item administered to 
the U.S. subjects, and the wording after in the version administered to English subjects. 
3. Study instrument 
a. Stimulus materials. The experimental stimulus used for the study consisted of two components. 
The first was a set of fictional newspaper articles: one, supplied to subjects in the “control” condition, 
which described a municipalities adoption of a provision requiring developers to post a “surety bond” to 
cover the installation of new traffic signals (Figure SI-2); another, supplied to subjects in the “anti-
pollution” condition, which described a call by the “American Academy of Geophysical Scientists” for 
“even stricter” CO2 emission controls “than ones proposed by the United Nations” (Figure SI-3); and a 
third, supplied to subjects in the “geoengineering” condition, which described a call by the same (fiction-
al) group of scientists for increased research into “new technologies aimed at counteracting the effects of 
climate change” as opposed to stricter controls on CO2 emissions (Figure SI-4).  
The second component of the stimulus was a document represented to be an excerpt from an ar-
ticle entitled “Irreversible climate change due to CO2 emissions,” and published in the journal “Nature 
Science” (Figure SI-1). The document, which described findings that suggested a dissipation rate for at-
mospheric CO2 slower than the one that had been estimated in previous studies, was in fact a composite 
of material appearing in two scientific journals (Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Meinshausen & 
Meinshausen 2009; Solomon, Plattner, Knutti & Friedlingstein 2009). 
Subjects read the newspaper story associated with their respective experimental conditions before 
reading the Nature Science article. In the anti-pollution and geoengineering condition newspaper stories, 
members of the American Academy of Geophysical Scientists were described as basing their respective 
proposals on their assessment of the Nature Science study. However, the Nature Science article itself did 
not propose or refer to any policy solutions, and both the anti-pollution condition and geoengineering 
condition newspaper stories explicitly stated that the Nature Science “study was done by researchers from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who were unaffiliated with AAGS.” 
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Figure SI-2. Control condition newspaper story. 
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Figure SI-3. Anti-pollution condition newspaper story. 
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Figure SI-4. Geoengineering condition newspaper story. 
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Figure SI-5. “Nature Science” article. 
b. Response measures. After reading the Nature Science article, subjects responded to four items 
designed to measure their assessment of the soundness and credibility of the article. The first, labeled 
convincing, stated: 
We would like to know what you think of the Nature Science study, excerpts of which you just 
read. In your view, how convincing was the study on a scale of 0-10 with 0 meaning “completely 
unconvincing” to 10 meaning “completely convincing”? 
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The next three directed the subjects to indicate on a six-point scale (“strongly disagree, moderately disag-
ree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, [or] strongly agree”) their disagreement or agree-
ment with a set of statements relating to the Nature Science study:  
Biased. The scientists who did the study were biased. 
Computers. Computer models like those relied on in the study are not a reliable basis for predict-
ing the impact of CO2 on the climate. 
Moredata. More studies must be done before policymakers rely on the findings of the Nature 
Science study. 
The four items (after reverse coding of convincing and z-score normalization of all variables) were com-
bined into a composite Likert scale (α = 0.84), which was transformed into a z-score and labeled 
study_validity (Smith 2000, p. 31). 
Finally, subjects responded to a set of items designed to measure their perceptions of climate 
change risks. They first indicated a six-point scale (“strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly dis-
agree, slightly agree, moderately agree, [or] strongly agree”) their level of disagreement or agreement 
with a set of factual statements relating to climate-change: 
Happening. Average global temperatures are increasing. 
Human. Human activity is causing global temperatures to rise. 
Effect. Unless steps are taken to counteract global warming, there will be bad consequences for 
human beings. 
They then responded to an item (gwrisk) that measured their overall assessment of the seriousness of cli-
mate change as a societal risk: 
We would like to know what you think of the Nature Science study, excerpts of which you just 
read. In your view, how convincing was the study on a scale of 0-10 with 0 meaning “completely 
unconvincing” to 10 meaning “completely convincing”? 
The four items (after z-score normalization of all variables) were combined into a composite Likert scale 
(a z-score transformation of the sum of the normalized responses to the items). The scale, labeled cc_risk, 
was highly reliable (α = 0.93). 
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4. Multivariate regression analysis 
The study hypotheses were tested by ordinary-least-squares multivariate regression analyses. Two 
analyses were performed: one for study_validity, the continuous Likert scale (centered at 0 and measured 
in increments of standard deviations from the mean) that measured the disposition to credit the Nature 
Science article; and another for cc_risk, the continuous Likert scale (also centered at 0 and measured in 
increments of standard deviations from the mean), that measured the disposition to be concerned about 
climate-change risks.  
Model predictors were selected to assess both the main effects of the experimental manipulation 
and the interaction of the manipulation with subject worldviews. The predictors included dummy va-
riables for the experimental conditions (“control,” “antipol,” “geoengineering,”); a dummy variable to 
indicate national subsample membership ( “US”: 0 = English subsample, 1 = U.S. subsample); the two 
continuous worldview scales (“Hierarchy,” and “Individualism”); and cross-product interaction terms to 
measure the effects of both the experimental manipulation conditional on subsample membership (“US x 
control,” US x antipol,” “US x Geo”) and worldviews conditional on subsample membership and experi-
mental condition (“Hier x U.S.”; “Individ x U.S.”; “Hier x control,” “Hier x antipol,” “Hier x geo,” “Indi-
vid x control,” “Individ x antipol,” “Individ x geo”; “U.S. x hier x control,” “U.S. x hier x antipol,” U.S. x 
hier x geo,” “U.S. x individ x control,” “U.S. x individ x antipol,” “U.S. x individ x geo”) (Cohen, Cohen, 
West & Aiken 2003, pp. 555-56).  
For expositional convenience, we vary the excluded or reference-group dummy variable asso-
ciated with the experimental conditions (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken 2003, pp. 303-04). In the analysis 
of study_validity, we exclude antipol, in order to highlight how being assigned either to the control or to 
the geoengineering condition affected subject assessments of the Nature Science study relative to assign-
ment to the anti-pollution condition. In the analysis of cc_risk, we exclude control, in order to highlight 
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how being assigned either to the antipollution and geoengineering conditions affected subject’s climate-
change risk perceptions relative to being assigned to the control condition.  
We report the analysis for each outcome variable separately. Predictors are entered in sets to faci-
litate ease of interpretation. 
Assessments of the validity of the Nature Science study  
Model 1 in Table SI-3 reflects the main effect of the experimental manipulation. Considered in-
dependently of subject worldviews, the impact of assignment to either the control or to the geoengineer-
ing condition rather than the anti-pollution condition was essentially nil.  
Considered independently of which experimental condition subjects were assigned, the impact of 
subject worldviews, in contrast, was substantial. As reflected in model 2, Hierarchy b =  -0.44, p < 0.01) 
and Individualism (b = -0.27, p < 0.01) independently predicted a disposition to dismiss the Nature 
Science study. These effects signify the impact of worldviews for the sample considered as a whole. 
Model 3 illustrates the interaction of the cultural worldview predictors and the experimental as-
signment. The coefficients for Hierarchy (b = 0.54, p < 0.01) and Individualism (b = -0.32, p < 0.01) (the 
impact of those respective predictors when both geo and control, and hence the cross-product interaction 
terms, are set to zero) indicate the impact of the worldviews in the anti-pollution condition; their negative 
signs indicate that in that condition both are associated with negative assessments of the validity of the 
Nature Science study. The coefficients for Hier x geo (b = 0.17, p < 0.01) and Individ x geo (b = 0.09, 
p = 0.02) represent the impact of the worldviews in the geoengineering condition relative to the anti-
pollution condition: their positive signs indicate that the geoengineering condition both worldviews are 
associated with less dismisiveness. The coefficient for Hier x control (b = 0.11, p < 0.01) is likewise posi-
tive, indicating that Hierarchy is associated with less dismissiveness toward the study in the control con-
dition than in the anti-pollution condition as well. Individualism is also associated with less dismissive-
ness in the control condition but the effect is nonsignificant (b = 0.05, p = 0.23). These effects, too, meas-
ure the impact of the predictors for the sample considered as a whole. 
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study_validity 
 
 
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
control -0.03 (-0.60) -0.05 (-1.21) -0.05 (-1.29) -0.04 (-0.70) 
geo 0.03 (0.73) 0.00 (0.10) 0.00 (0.08) 0.04 (0.83) 
Hierarchy 
  
-0.44 (-27.09) -0.54 (-18.64) -0.22 (-5.38) 
Individualism 
  
-0.27 (-16.83) -0.32 (-11.49) -0.23 (-6.13) 
Hier x control 
    
0.11 (2.73) -0.01 (-0.26) 
Hier x geo 
    
0.17 (4.36) 0.12 (2.17) 
Individ x control 
    
0.05 (1.21) 0.06 (1.16) 
Individ x geo 
    
0.09 (2.27) 0.08 (1.51) 
US 
      
-0.05 (-0.86) 
US x control 
      
-0.03 (-0.35) 
US x geo 
      
-0.10 (-1.32) 
US x hier 
      
-0.60 (-10.91) 
US x individ 
      
-0.18 (-3.35) 
US x hier x control 
      
0.19 (2.46) 
US x hier x geo 
      
0.06 (0.75) 
US x ind x control 
      
-0.04 (-0.57) 
US x individ x geo 
      
0.03 (0.38) 
Constant 0.00 (-0.07) 0.01 (0.48) 0.02 (0.59) 0.04 (1.09) 
R2  0.00 
 
0.27 
 
0.28 
 
0.35 
 F-test (2, 2826) 0.91 (4, 2824) 255.54 (8, 2820) 132.58 (17, 2811) 89.57 
Δ F-test 
  
(2, 2824) 507.61 (4, 2820) 6.09 (9, 2820) 37.44 
Table SI-3. Multivariate regression analysis for study_validity. N = 2829. The dependent variable is 
study_validity. Regression weights are unstandardized OLS coefficients, with corresponding t-statistic indicated 
parenthetically. Bold typeface denotes that the indicated coefficient, model R2, model F-statistic, or change in F-
statistic associated with the introduction of additional predictors is statistically significant at p < 0.05. Multiple im-
putation was used for observations with missing data (Little & Rubin 2002). 
Finally, model 4 adds the predictors necessary to compare responses of subjects in the English 
and U.S. subsamples. Controlling for worldview, English subjects formed essentially the same view of 
the validity of the study in the control (b = -0.04, p = 0.48) and geoengineering (b = 0.04, p = 0.41) con-
ditions as they did in the anti-pollution condition; for English subjects, being assigned the geoengineering 
as opposed to the control condition (Δb = 0.08, p = 0.13) was associated with a small but nonsignificant 
disposition to credit the study. U.S. subjects in the control (b = -0.03, p = 0.72) and geoengineering (US x 
geo b = -0.10 p < 0.19) conditions were slightly but nonsignificantly more dismissive than U.S. subjects 
assigned to the anti-pollution condition, again controlling for worldview. The impact of being a U.S. as 
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opposed to an English subject controlling for worldview and experimental assignment was close to nil 
(ΔEM = -0.03, SEM = 0.03, p = 0.39). 
The negative coefficients for Hierarchy (b = -0.22, p < 0.01) and Individualism (b = -0.23, 
p < 0.01) signify that for members of the English subsample in the anti-pollution condition both 
worldviews were associated with a disposition to dismiss the study. The negative (and statistically signifi-
cant) coefficients associated with US x hier (b = -0.60, p < 0.01) and US x individ (b = -0.18, p < 0.01), 
indicate that the disposition to dismiss associated with both worldviews was even stronger for members of 
the U.S. subsample assigned the anti-pollution condition. The positive coefficient associated with US x 
hier x control (b = 0.19, p = 0.01) indicates that the tendency of Hierarchy to generate dismissiveness in 
the anti-pollution condition relative to the control was greater for members of the U.S. subsample than for 
members of the English one. 
The coefficients for both Individ x geo (b = 0.08, p = 0.13)and US x individ x geo (b = 0.03, 
p = 0.70) were both positive but nonsignificant. Thus, Individualism did not generate an effect for either 
subsample that differed significantly from its effect in generating dismissiveness for the sample as a 
whole in the anti-pollution condition (Table SI-3, Model 3, Individualism: b = 0.09, p < 0.01).  
The joint effects of Hierarchy and Individualism for the sample as a whole was and for each sub-
sample are estimated and plotted in Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
Climate change risk perceptions 
Model 1 in Table SI-4 indicates that the experimental manipulation had a mild effect indepen-
dently of subjects’ worldviews and subsample membership. The positive coefficient for geo (b = 0.13, 
p < 0.01) indicates that being assigned to the geoengineering condition as opposed the control condition 
increased concern. The negative effect for the constant indicates that the average level of concern in the 
geoengineering and anti-pollution condition exceeded the level of concern in the control. 
Model 2 indicates that both worldviews were associated with less concern (Hierarchy: b = -0.53, 
p < 0.01; Individ: b = -0.31, p < 0.01). These effects reflect the sample-wide impact of the cultural 
worldview predictors controlling for experimental assignment. 
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cc_risk 
 
 
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
antipol 0.06 (1.33) 0.08 (2.30) 0.08 (2.32) 0.08 (1.65) 
geo 0.13 (2.79) 0.12 (3.19) 0.12 (3.21) 0.16 (3.38) 
Hierarchy 
  
-0.53 (-36.09) -0.51 (-19.76) -0.31 (-9.16) 
Individualism 
  
-0.31 (-20.88) -0.32 (-12.25) -0.18 (-5.28) 
Hier x antipol 
    
-0.07 (-2.01) 0.00 (-0.05) 
Hier x geo 
    
-0.01 (-0.30) 0.01 (0.18) 
Individ x antipol 
    
0.01 (0.24) 0.03 (0.59) 
Individ x geo 
    
0.01 (0.18) 0.02 (0.48) 
US 
      
-0.18 (-3.71) 
US x antipol 
      
0.02 (0.24) 
US x geo 
      
-0.10 (-1.48) 
US x hier 
      
-0.41 (-8.65) 
US x individ 
      
-0.29 (-5.94) 
Hier x US x antipol 
      
-0.09 (-1.31) 
Hier x US x geo 
      
-0.03 (-0.52) 
US x individ x antipol 
      
-0.02 (-0.31) 
Individ x US x geo 
      
0.00 (-0.04) 
Constant -0.06 (-1.96) -0.07 (-2.64) -0.07 (-2.66) 0.02 (0.65) 
R2  0.00 
 
0.38 
 
0.38 
 
0.47 
 F-test (2, 2826) 3.89 (4, 2824) 436.80 (8, 2820) 
 
(17, 2811) 145.15 
Δ F-test 
  
(2, 2824) 219.16 (4, 2820) 
 
(9, 2820) 49.18 
Table SI-4. Multivariate analysis for cc_risk. N = 2829. The dependent variable is cc_risk. Regression weights are 
unstandardized OLS coefficients, with corresponding t-statistic indicated parenthetically. Bold typeface denotes that 
the indicated coefficient, model R2, model F-statistic, or change in F-statistic associated with the introduction of 
additional predictors is statistically significant at p < 0.05. Multiple imputation was used for observations with miss-
ing data (Little & Rubin 2002). 
Taking experimental assignment into account, Hierarchy (b = -0.07, p = 0.05) predicts even 
greater skepticism about climate change in the anti-pollution condition than in the control condition 
(Table SI-4, Model 3). Hierarchy predicts a slightly greater negative effect in the anti-pollution condition 
(relative to the control) for U.S. subjects than for English (US x hier x antipol: b = -0.09, p = 0.19 in Ta-
ble SI-4, Model 4) but the effect is nonsignificant. There are no other meaningful or significant sample-
wide interactions between the worldviews and the experimental assignments. The impact of the experi-
mental assignments for the sample as a whole are estimated and plotted in Figure 6. 
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